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Affective Boundaries of Scope Insensitivity
HANNAH H. CHANG
MICHEL TUAN PHAM
People can be surprisingly insensitive to quantities in valuation judgments—a phe-
nomenon called scope insensitivity, which is generally attributed to the operation
of affective processes in judgment. Building on research showing that affect is in-
herently a decision-making system of the present, we propose that scope insensi-
tivity is more likely to be observed in decisions that are psychologically proximate
to the immediate self. Consistent with this proposition, results from seven experi-
ments (and two replications) show that scope insensitivity is more prevalent in
decisions that are temporally proximate, both prospectively (near future vs. distant
future) and retrospectively (recent past vs. distant past), and in decisions that are
psychologically proximate in terms of social or physical distance. In addition to
clarifying the boundaries of the scope-insensitivity phenomenon, these findings
help refine our understanding of the affective system of judgment. Specifically, the
findings suggest that the affective system of judgment and decision making is not
just a system of the present, it is more generally a system of the immediate self.
Any form of distance from the immediate self (in time, social relation, or physical
space) tends to attenuate the engagement of the overall affective system.
Keywords: affect, scope insensitivity, judgment, self, psychological proximity
While consumer decision making has historicallybeen studied from a cognitive perspective
(Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998), there is mounting
evidence that consumers often rely on their emotional feel-
ings to make judgments and decisions (Adaval 2001;
Darke, Chattopadhyay, and Ashworth 2006; Pham 1998,
2004; Ratner and Herbst 2005; Schwarz and Clore 2007).
This reliance on feelings in judgments and decisions seems
to tap into a separate system of judgment with its own
characteristics (Epstein and Pacini 1999; Strack and
Deutsch 2004). It has been theorized that a major charac-
teristic of the affective system of judgment is an inherent
anchoring on the present: the overall affective system of
judgment becomes more engaged whenever decisions in-
volve targets or outcomes that are temporally close (Chang
and Pham 2013). In support of this theoretical proposition,
Chang and Pham (2013) review various bodies of findings
consistent with the notion that the affective system is
present-oriented and report empirical evidence that, every-
thing else being equal, momentary feelings are relied upon
more (weighted more heavily) in decisions wherein targets
or outcomes are temporally closer.
In this research, we propose that the present orientation
of the affective system reflects a broader principle: an an-
choring of this system on the immediate self in the “here
and now.” Any form of proximity to the immediate self
encourages reliance on the affective system, and any major
source of psychological distance—whether temporal
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distance, social distance, or physical distance—tends to re-
duce the engagement of the affective system. A major the-
oretical implication of this general principle is that
judgment biases that are typically attributed to affect
should be more pronounced in decisions that are psycho-
logically proximate to the immediate self than in decisions
that are psychologically more distant. This research tests
this prediction in the context of a well-known bias gener-
ally attributed to affect: the scope-insensitivity phenome-
non (Desvousges et al. 1993; Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004;
Kahneman and Knetsch 1992). Scope insensitivity is the
phenomenon whereby valuation judgments exhibit strong
insensitivity to the magnitude or scope of the object(s) be-
ing valuated. For example, a consumer might not be will-
ing to pay more for a set of 10 second-hand Madonna CDs
than for a set of five (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004).
According to a popular explanation, this phenomenon
arises because certain valuation judgments trigger a reli-
ance on affect, which in turn prompts an insensitivity to
quantitative information (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004;
Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade 1999). However, although
the phenomenon has been observed in a large number of
studies in the domain of contingent valuations, the evi-
dence has been inconsistent, leaving some to question the
empirical reality of the phenomenon (Carson 1997). By in-
vestigating this phenomenon through the lens of an anchor-
ing of the affective system to the immediate self, the
present research provides a parsimonious account of the
likely boundaries of scope insensitivity. Specifically, we
argue that scope insensitivity is more likely to be observed
in decisions that are psychologically proximate to the self,
whereas sensitivity to scope is more likely found in deci-
sions that are psychologically more distant, whether in
time, space, or social relation.
Consistent with this proposition, we report seven studies
(six experiments and one field study, plus two replica-
tions), involving more than 2,120 participants, showing
that the scope-insensitivity phenomenon is more likely to
be observed in judgments and decisions that are psycholog-
ically proximate to the immediate self. This result was ob-
served across temporal, social, and spatial dimensions of
proximity, including (a) when the decision involves a near
future versus a more distant future; (b) when the judgment
evokes a recent past versus a more distant past; (c) when
the decision involves a close friend versus a more distant
acquaintance; and (d) when the decision involves someone
who lives nearby versus someone who lives farther away.
Additional results indicate that various dimensions of psy-
chological proximity (temporal, social, and physical) mod-
erate the scope-insensitivity phenomenon only when the
decision task is conducive to a reliance on affect, such as
when the decision object is affect-rich or when the decision
maker has experiential motives. When the decision is not
conducive to a reliance on affect—such as when the deci-
sion object is affect-poor or when the decision maker has
instrumental motives—scope insensitivity tends to dissi-
pate, regardless of psychological proximity.
The findings therefore clarify the boundaries of the
scope-insensitivity phenomenon. Equally important (if not
more), the findings help refine our understanding of the
overall affective system of judgment. First, our findings
suggest that the differential engagement of the affective
system across time perspectives is not limited just to the in-
tensity with which affect is experienced (Loewenstein
1996; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999), nor to the degree to
which people rely on their affective experience in judg-
ment (Chang and Pham 2013), but likely extends to the
various judgment biases that affect is known to produce.
Second, whereas Chang and Pham (2013) hypothesized
that affect is inherently a decision-making system of the
present, our findings suggest that it is more precisely a
decision-making system of the immediate self. Any form
of distance from the immediate self (in time, social rela-
tion, or physical space) tends to attenuate the engagement
of the affective system. Third, our findings identify an im-
portant and previously unrecognized boundary condition of
the scope-insensitivity phenomenon, helping explain why
it is sometimes observed and sometimes not observed in
previous studies. Fourth, our findings generalize scope for
contingent value of environmental amenities (which typi-
cally do not have clear market prices) to consumer-based
products or services. Finally, our findings suggest a
straightforward method to attenuate the problem of scope
insensitivity in policy-oriented contingent-valuation sur-
veys—a method that is easier to implement than common
remedies proposed to date.
SCOPE INSENSITIVITY, AFFECT, AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROXIMITY
Scope Insensitivity in Valuation
How much would a passenger be willing to pay for help-
ing offset the 2.85 tons of carbon emissions generated by
her flight from Singapore to Los Angeles? How much
would a consumer be willing to pay for a day pass at an
amusement park with 12 major attractions? How much
would one be willing to donate to a program that improves
the lives of 10,000 children every year? Each of these deci-
sions involves a subjective valuation judgment that should
logically reflect the magnitude or scope of the target ob-
ject. Everything else being equal, one should be willing to
pay more to offset a larger carbon footprint than to offset a
smaller carbon footprint, for a day pass to an amusement
park with more attractions than for a day pass to a park
with fewer attractions, and for a charitable cause that
improves more lives than for one that improves fewer lives.
Yet when making such valuation judgments, people can
sometimes be surprisingly insensitive to the magnitude or
scope of the target object (Kahneman 1986; Kahneman and
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Knetsch 1992), a finding that came to be known as scope
insensitivity. For example, in a well-known study con-
ducted in 1991 (Desvousges et al. 1993), different groups
of participants were asked how much they would be will-
ing to pay (WTP) to save 2,000, 20,000, or 200,000 migrat-
ing birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds caused by
an environmental crisis in 1989. Despite the vastly differ-
ent numbers of birds involved, participants’ WTP was
found to be quite comparable across groups, suggesting
that the number of birds at risk was not adequately taken
into account in these valuation judgments.
This phenomenon has been replicated in a large number
of studies (see Carson 1997; Frederick and Fischhoff 1998
for reviews). Although most replications have been in the
domain of contingent valuations—that is, the valuation of
goods that do not have clear market prices (e.g., willing-
ness to donate to charitable causes, damage awards in jury
trials, willingness to accept environmental risks, compen-
sations for workplace hazards)—similar results have been
observed in judgments that are more typical of consump-
tion decisions, such as willingness to pay for a collection
of music CDs (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004) and choice of
lottery tickets (Urminsky and Kivetz 2011). However,
along with many demonstrations of the phenomenon, there
have also been many failures to replicate it. For example, a
classic demonstration of scope insensitivity is the
Desvousges et al. (1993) “migrating birds” study men-
tioned earlier. On the other hand, a well-known study
showing ample sensitivity to scope is the so-called “Long
Beach Harbor study.” In this study, respondents were asked
their willingness to pay for a program that would accelerate
the recovery of fish species by either 45 years (from
50 years to 5 years) or 10 years (from 15 years to 5 years).
Results indicated that respondents were willing to donate
more to the former program than the latter program. Such
mixed empirical demonstration of scope (in)sensitivity has
led some to question the authenticity of the phenomenon
(Carson 1997).
Table 1 summarizes a selection of previous studies that
have yielded mixed findings with respect to scope insensi-
tivity.1 As we will explain, the reason why scope insensi-
tivity was observed in some of these studies and not in
others becomes clear once one recognizes (a) the role of af-
fect in the basic phenomenon and (b) the architecture of
the affective system of judgment.
An Affect-Based Explanation of Scope
Insensitivity
A prominent explanation for the scope-insensitivity phe-
nomenon is that valuation judgments are often based on
the person’s affective responses to a prototypical mental
representation of the target (Kahneman et al. 1999), a prop-
osition consistent with the broader notion of a pervasive af-
fect heuristic of evaluation (Pham 2004; Schwarz and
Clore 2007; Slovic et al. 2002). According to Kahneman
and colleagues (1999), when asked to perform various val-
uation judgments, people may construct a mental image of
prototypical exemplars of the objects to be valuated. For
example, in Desvouges and colleagues’ (1993) migrating
birds study, participants may have mentally pictured “an
exhausted bird, its feathers soaked in black oil, unable to
escape” (Kahneman et al. 1999, 212). Because they involve
prototypical exemplars, these mental representations tend
to exclude quantitative information. As a result, valuation
judgments based on affect tend to be more scope-
insensitive.
In a series of studies, Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) pro-
vide evidence that the scope-insensitivity phenomenon
may indeed be due to a reliance on affect. In one study,
participants were asked how much money they would be
willing to donate to rescue either one or four pandas that
were recently discovered in a remote area. The researchers
manipulated participants’ likelihood of reliance on affect
by representing the pandas in either an affect-rich fashion,
showing a cute picture of each panda, or an affect-poor
manner, representing each panda by a simple dot. When
the pandas were represented in an affect-rich manner, par-
ticipants were willing to donate a comparable amount of
money to save one panda or to save four pandas, indicating
scope insensitivity. However, when the pandas were repre-
sented in an affect-poor manner, participants were willing
to donate significantly more to save four pandas than to
save one panda, indicating appropriate sensitivity to scope.
Affect as a Decision-Making System of the
Present
Several prominent affect and emotion theorists concep-
tualize affect as reflecting the operation of a separate sys-
tem of judgment (Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson 1999;
Damasio 1994; Plutchik 1980; Zajonc 1980). This system
is generally believed to be more basic and primary, and
evolutionarily older, than the system that supports the
more cognitive or computational form of judgment
(Epstein 1990; Plutchik 1980; Zajonc 1980). Compared to
cognitive evaluations, affective evaluations have genuinely
distinct characteristics (see Pham 2007 for a review).
Chang and Pham (2013) advanced the general thesis that
the affective system of judgment is inherently anchored in
the present. They reviewed a broad range of findings from
various literatures showing that (a) affect is experienced
more intensely in relation to outcomes that are close to the
present; (b) certain emotional areas of the brain are en-
gaged only in decisions involving immediate outcomes;
and (c) affect tends to promote impatience. According to
1 These studies were selected because their designs and method
descriptions provided sufficient information for interpretation along
our theoretical propositions.
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Chang and Pham (2013), these various findings reflect a
fundamental characteristic of the architecture of the affec-
tive system of judgment: the entire system is more engaged
whenever decisions involve targets or outcomes that are
close to the present. As additional support for this general
thesis, these authors report a series of studies showing that
affective feelings are relied upon more and perceived to be
more informative in judgments and decisions wherein tar-
gets or outcomes are temporally proximate than in judg-
ments and decisions wherein targets or outcomes are
temporally more distant.
Is Scope Insensitivity Specific to the Here and
Now?
We propose that the present orientation of the affective
system reflects a broader theoretical principle: an anchor-
ing of this system on the immediate self in the here and
now. Various prominent theorists and extant empirical
findings point to an intimate link between affect and the
immediate self. For example, Damasio (1994, 1999) pro-
poses that feelings and emotions play a critical role in deci-
sion making, especially those that relate directly to the self
and immediate environment (see also de Sousa 1991). The
feelings experienced in the present are often used as self-
referential interpretations about the outside world
(Solomon 1993). Accordingly, affective judgments tend to
describe “not so much what is in the object. . .but some-
thing that is in ourselves” (Zajonc 1980, 157). Empirical
studies have found that momentary feelings are relied on
more in judgments and decisions related to the self than in
those related to objects or others (Forgas 1991; Gorn,
Pham, and Sin 2001; Raghunathan and Pham 1999). In ad-
dition, drawing one’s attention to the self leads to intensi-
fied affective reactions (Mor and Winquist 2002; Scheier
1976). While these studies show that a focus on the self
enhances the influence of affect, other studies show that,
conversely, the experience of affect directs attention to the
self (Salovey 1992; Silvia et al. 2006). Taken together,
these theoretical conceptualizations and empirical studies
support the notion of a powerful, bidirectional link between
affect and the immediate self.
We therefore propose that the affective system of judg-
ment inherently anchors on the immediate self. Because
people can directly experience only the here and now, the
immediate self serves as an egocentric reference point.
Different forms of departure from this egocentric reference
point—that is, different forms of psychological distance,
whether in time, space, or social relation (Trope and
Liberman 2010)—should mitigate the overall engagement
of the affective system in judgment.
A major theoretical implication of this general principle
is that judgment biases that are typically attributed to affect
should be more pronounced in decisions that are psycho-
logically proximate to the immediate self than in decisions
that are psychologically more distant. If the scope-
insensitivity phenomenon is indeed driven by a reliance on
affect in valuation, then the phenomenon should be more
likely in valuations of targets that are psychologically
proximate than in valuations of targets that are psychologi-
cally more distant. Returning to the various studies listed
in table 1, which have yielded mixed demonstrations of
scope insensitivity, we conjecture that the findings that
support scope insensitivity were mostly obtained under
conditions that favor a reliance on affect due to a high
proximity to the immediate self. For example, Desvousges
et al.’s (1993) migrating birds study mentioned earlier in-
volved a short time horizon. In another study (Kahneman
and Knetsch 1992), participants were asked their WTP for
three environmental-preparedness programs that varied in
coverage. Participants’ WTP was again largely insensitive
to the scope of these programs, which were both physically
and temporally proximate. In contrast, findings that failed
to support scope insensitivity (indicated sensitivity to
scope) were mostly obtained largely under conditions that
discouraged a reliance on affect due to a greater distance
from the immediate self. For example, the Long Beach
Harbor study discussed earlier involved a much longer
time horizon. Similarly, in a well-known study, Carson and
colleagues (1994) found substantial sensitivity to scope in
participants’ WTP for natural-resource programs with out-
comes expected to materialize in the distant future. Table 1
provides suggested coding of these previous studies in
terms of self-proximity. Although these codings should be
interpreted with caution given that they were performed
retroactively with knowledge of the studies’ results, it is
noteworthy that proximity to the self is a strong predic-
tor—or rather “postdictor”—of whether or not scope insen-
sitivity was observed. As indicated in the last column of
the table, of the 40 tests provided by these studies, 33
(82.5%) yielded results that are consistent with our pro-
posed hypothesis, suggesting a strong association between
proximity and scope insensitivity (/¼ .65).
The purpose of the present research is therefore to pro-
vide stronger and more direct evidence that because the re-
liance on affect is contingent on a proximity to the
immediate self, the scope-insensitivity phenomenon is
equally dependent on such a proximity. Through this dem-
onstration we intend to make five contributions. First, the
findings would clarify the boundaries of the scope-
insensitivity phenomenon, thereby explaining inconsistent
observations of scope insensitivity in some of the previous
studies. Second, the findings would refine our understand-
ing of the overall affective system of judgment by showing
that the differential engagement of the affective system
likely extends to the various judgment biases that affect is
known to produce. Third, the findings would suggest that
affect is not only a decision-making system of the present
but also more generally a decision-making system of the
immediate self. Any form of proximity to the immediate
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self, not just temporal, would promote engagement of the
affective system. Fourth, the findings would generalize the
scope-insensitivity phenomenon, which is typically ob-
served in contingent valuation of environmental amenities,
to valuation of consumer-based products or services.
Finally, the findings would identify a more direct and cost-
effective method to mitigate the problem of scope insensi-
tivity in designing contingent-valuation surveys, compared
to common remedies used in practice.
We tested our predictions in seven studies (and two rep-
lications) involving several decision domains, revisiting
classic scope-insensitivity problems and testing new con-
sumption episodes under different conditions of psycholog-
ical proximity, including temporal, social, and spatial
proximity. The first two experiments test for scope insensi-
tivity when the target is associated with a near future ver-
sus a more distant future. Experiments 3A and 3B test for
scope insensitivity when the target evokes a recent past
versus a more distant past. Experiment 4A examines the
phenomenon when the decision involves a friend who lives
nearby versus a friend who lives farther away, and experi-
ment 4B tests the phenomenon when the decision involves
a close colleague versus a more distant colleague. The final
experiment tests for scope insensitivity as a function of
both social proximity and likely reliance on affect in the
decision.
EXPERIMENT 1: SCOPE
(IN)SENSITIVITY, AFFECT RICHNESS,
AND NEAR- VERSUS DISTANT-FUTURE
OUTCOMES
This experiment revisits the classic Hsee and
Rottenstreich (2004) panda study. In the original study,
participants were asked how much they would be willing
to donate (WTD) to save either one or four pandas that had
been discovered recently in a remote area. The pandas
were represented either in an affect-rich manner (with pic-
tures) or in an affect-poor manner (with simple dots). Hsee
and Rottenstreich (2004) found that participants’ WTD
was scope-insensitive only in the affect-rich condition; in
the affect-poor condition, participants’ WTD was sensitive
to the number of pandas at risk—a finding that the
researchers attributed to a disengagement of affective pro-
cesses of evaluation when the pandas were represented in
an abstract manner (see Metcalfe and Mischel 1999 about
the “cooling” effect of symbolic representations).
In this experiment, we investigate whether Hsee and
Rottenstreich’s (2004) findings depend on temporal prox-
imity. Whereas the original study assumed a single time
frame, our study included two time-frame conditions. In
one condition a threat to the pandas’ habitat was to occur
in the near future, whereas in the other condition the threat
was to occur in the more distant future. We predicted that
in the near-future condition, participants’ donations would
be scope-insensitive if the pandas were represented in an
affect-rich manner but not if the pandas were represented
in an affect-poor manner, thus replicating Hsee and
Rottenstreich’s (2004) results. In contrast, we predicted
that in the distant-future condition, participants’ donations
would be sensitive to the number of pandas, regardless of
how the pandas were represented; that is, even if the pan-
das were represented in an affect-rich manner, participants’
donations would be sensitive to the scope.
Method
Overview. A total of 636 Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) participants (47% women; average age¼ 33)
were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions of a 2
(representation: affect-rich vs. affect-poor) 2 (scope: 1
panda vs. 4 pandas) 2 (temporal proximity: near future
vs. distant future) between-subjects design.
Procedure and Measures. The study was modeled after
Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) study 3. Participants were
asked to imagine that a team of student volunteers from a
local university had recently discovered either one or four
panda(s) in a remote Asian region. All participants were in-
formed that the pandas’ survival was threatened by
impending construction in the forest area where the pandas
were discovered. In the near-future condition, the construc-
tion projects were set to begin “next month,” whereas in
the distant-future condition, the construction projects were
set to begin “in two years.” Participants received either an
affect-rich representation of the panda(s) (one or four pic-
tures) or an affect-poor representation of the panda(s) (one
or four simple dots).
As the main dependent measure, participants were asked
to indicate how much they would be willing to donate
(WTD) to save the panda(s) by selecting a number between
$0 and $25 (in $5 increments in US dollars). To test for po-
tential confounds, participants’ mood was measured on six
seven-point items (e.g., “bad/good,” “unpleasant/pleasant”;
a¼ .92), and their task involvement was assessed on two
seven-point items (e.g., “I found the task of deciding how
much money to donate to be very interesting”; r¼ .37). As
a demand check, participants were asked to guess the pur-
pose of the study. As a check for the temporal-proximity
manipulation, participants were asked to rate how tempo-
rally proximate or distant was the risk that the pandas
would lose their habitat on a scale of 1 (next month) to 7
(two years from next month). Finally, participants were
asked to report their gender, age, and general liking of pan-
das (1¼ not at all; 7¼ very much).
Results
Preliminary Analyses. Ten participants were removed
from the analyses because it was evident from their
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response times that they did not read the materials prop-
erly; another 10 participants were removed because they
indicated they do not like pandas at all, thus leaving 616
usable observations. An ANOVA of the perceived tempo-
ral proximity of the risk to the pandas revealed a main ef-
fect of temporal proximity (F(1, 608)¼ 432.34, p< .0001),
indicating that the risk was perceived to be temporally
closer in the near-future condition (M¼ 1.71) than in the
distant-future condition (M¼ 4.51). A marginally signifi-
cant main effect of scope (F(1, 608)¼ 3.42, p< .07) indi-
cated that the risk was perceived to be slightly closer in the
four-panda condition (M¼ 2.98) than in the one-panda
condition (M¼ 3.26). An ANOVA of participants’ mood
showed no differences across conditions (ps> .11).
Participants’ reported task involvement exhibited a repre-
sentation scope interaction (F(1, 608)¼ 4.43, p< .04);
participants in the affect-poor condition were slightly more
involved when four pandas were at stake (M¼ 5.56) than
when only one was at stake (M¼ 5.17), whereas partici-
pants in the affect-rich condition were equally involved
whether one (M¼ 5.34) or four pandas were at stake
(M¼ 5.24). Additional analyses show that these differen-
ces do not account for the main results.
WTD. As shown in figure 1, in the near-future condi-
tions, participants’ WTD was sensitive to the scope of the
target when it was represented in an affect-poor manner
(M1¼ $8.75 vs. M4¼ $12.59; F(1, 608)¼ 7.22, p¼ .007,
g2p¼ .012), but insensitive to the scope of the target when
it was represented in an affect-rich manner (M1¼ $11.75
vs. M4¼ $11.47; F< 1). This simple two-way interaction
(F(1, 608)¼ 4.14, p¼ .042, g2p¼ .007) replicates Hsee and
Rottenstreich’s (2004) findings. However, in the distant-
future conditions, there was no such interaction between
scope and affect richness (F< 1). Instead, there was only a
simple main effect of scope (F(1, 608)¼ 9.60, p¼ .002,
g2p¼ .016), showing that participants’ WTD was sensitive
to the scope of the target both when it was represented in
an affect-poor manner (M1¼ $9.54 vs. M4¼ $13.40; F(1,
608)¼ 7.41, p¼ .007, g2p¼ .012) and when it was repre-
sented in an affect-rich manner (M1¼ $10.71 vs.
M4¼ 13.11; F(1, 608)¼ 2.79, p¼ .095, g2p¼ .005).
Therefore, consistent with our predictions, under a greater
temporal distance, scope insensitivity dissipates regardless
of the affect richness of the target.
Although this pattern of results would seem to imply an
overall three-way interaction, this interaction was not sig-
nificant (F(1, 608)¼ .87, p¼ .35). This is because enor-
mous statistical power would be required to detect an
overall interaction with the predicted pattern of results.2
Therefore, to obtain a more focused and powerful statisti-
cal test of our predictions, we performed a series of
interaction contrasts (Keppel and Wickens 2004). One set
of contrasts showed that the simple effect of scope was sig-
nificant (F(1, 608)¼ 16.66, p< .0001, g2p¼ .027) and com-
parable (F(2, 608)< 1) in the following three conditions:
(a) affect-rich/distant-future, (b) affect-poor/near-future,
and (c) affect-poor/distant-future. In a final interaction con-
trast, we pooled the simple effects of scope in these three
conditions and compared the pooled effect to the simple ef-
fect of scope in the affect-rich/near-future condition. The
contrast was significant (F(1, 608)¼ 4.77, p¼ .029,
g2p¼ .008), confirming stronger scope insensitivity in the
affect-rich/near-future condition than in the other three
conditions.
Discussion
The results provide initial evidence that the scope-
insensitivity phenomenon is more likely to occur in deci-
sions wherein target or outcome is temporally proximate
than in decisions wherein target or outcome is temporally
more distant. As in Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) study,
in the near-future condition participants’ donations exhib-
ited scope insensitivity under affect-rich representations of
the target but not under affect-poor representations. These
results confirm the proposition that scope insensitivity is
partly the result of affective processes in valuation.
However, in the distant-future condition, participants’ don-
ations exhibited sensitivity to scope under both affect-rich
and affect-poor representations of the target. That is, even
when targets are represented in an affect-rich manner, peo-
ple would not be scope-insensitive if the decision seems
temporally distant. This overall pattern of results is consis-
tent with the notion that for scope insensitivity to arise, af-
fect must be present (as Hsee and Rottenstreich had
suggested), but for affect to trigger scope insensitivity,
there is another necessary condition: the decision frame
needs to be temporally proximal. This study’s key findings
were replicated in a lab experiment, described in the web
appendix.
One could argue that the observed scope insensitivity
under a near-future/affect-rich condition may have been
driven not by a differential engagement of the affective
system across temporal proximity but by some unintended
correlates of the temporal-proximity manipulation. The
greater proximity of the threat in the near-future condition
may have triggered a greater sense of urgency, thus
prompting participants to donate regardless of the number
of pandas. Alternatively, people may have felt more con-
strained about their budget in the near-future condition,
thus donating somewhat less regardless of the number of
pandas. However, both explanations seem unlikely given
that participants’ donations did exhibit sensitivity to scope
in the near-future/affect-poor condition. Thus, overall, the
findings support the notion that the moderating role of tem-
poral proximity on scope insensitivity is linked to a
2 More than 4,900 participants, about 615 per condition, would be re-
quired to achieve a statistical power of .70 for the predicted pattern of
results.
CHANG AND PHAM 11
differential engagement of affective processes for proxi-
mate versus distant targets or outcomes.
EXPERIMENT 2: SCOPE
(IN)SENSITIVITY, CONSUMPTION
MOTIVE, AND NEAR- VERSUS
DISTANT-FUTURE OUTCOMES
The purpose of this experiment was to provide further
evidence that if temporal proximity moderates the scope-
insensitivity phenomenon, it is because of a differential re-
liance on affect when outcomes or targets are temporally
proximate versus distant. In order to obtain such evidence,
in this experiment we manipulated participants’ likelihood
of reliance on affect in addition to manipulating scope and
temporal proximity. Given that a reliance on affect is
greater when consumers have experiential motives than
when they have instrumental motives (Pham 1998), we en-
couraged half of the participants to make their valuation
judgments assuming an experiential motive, and the other
half to make their valuation judgments assuming an instru-
mental motive. We predicted that participants who had an
experiential motive, and were therefore more inclined to
rely on their feelings to make judgments, would exhibit
scope-insensitive valuations under temporally proximate
conditions but not under temporally distant conditions,
thus replicating the pattern of results in the affect-rich con-
ditions of experiment 1. In contrast, participants who had
an instrumental motive, and were therefore less inclined to
rely on their feelings to begin with, would not exhibit
scope insensitivity regardless of temporal proximity, thus
replicating the pattern of results in the affect-poor condi-
tions of experiment 1.
Method
Overview. A total of 382 students at Singapore
Management University (56.7% women; average age¼ 21)
were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions of a 2
(consumption motive: experiential vs. instrumental) 2
(scope: 6 vs. 12 attractions) 2 (temporal proximity: near
future vs. distant future) between-subjects design. They
were asked to evaluate and report their WTP for a day pass
to an amusement park.
Procedure and Measures. Participants were asked to
imagine traveling to a foreign city where they would have
an opportunity to visit amusement parks. In the near-future
condition, the trip was to take place in “just a week.” In the
distant-future condition, the trip was to take place “next
year.” In the experiential-motive condition, the trip was de-
scribed as a fun-filled vacation that included a potential
visit to a theme park. In the instrumental-motive condition,
the trip was described as a business case competition, spon-
sored by a theme park company, that involved an informa-
tional visit to a theme park as a means to research the case.
All participants were asked to evaluate a day pass to a
theme park, giving them access to select attractions for a
fixed fee. Depending on scope conditions, the pass in-
cluded admission to either six or 12 attractions, each
FIGURE 1
EFFECT OF TEMPORAL PROXIMITY, SCOPE, AND AFFECT RICHNESS ON WILLINGNESS TO DONATE (EXPERIMENT 1)
$11.75
$8.75
$10.71
$9.54
$11.47
$12.59 $13.11
$13.40
$6
$8
$10
$12
$14
$16
$18
Affect-rich Affect-poor Affect-rich Affect-poor
Near future Distant future
W
TD
1 panda 4 pandas
NOTE.—Error bars represent þ/–1 standard error.
12 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
described by a short paragraph with a picture, presented in
a counterbalanced fashion.
As the main dependent measure, participants were asked
to state the maximum price that they would be willing to
pay for the one-day pass, by selecting a number between
$0 and $150 (presented in $10 increments in Singapore
dollars). As a demand check, participants were asked to
guess the purpose of the study. As a manipulation check of
scope, participants were asked to indicate “how many
attractions were included.” Finally, participants were asked
to report their gender, age, and general interest in amuse-
ment parks and rides (1¼ not at all interested; 7¼ very
interested).
Results
Preliminary Analyses. Although none of the partici-
pants guessed the purpose of the study correctly, 11 were
removed from the analyses because they did not complete
the main dependent measures, four were removed for hav-
ing taken the study previously, and another eight were re-
moved because they indicated being “not at all interested”
in amusement parks and rides, leaving 359 usable observa-
tions. Participants were quite accurate in their estimates of
the number of attractions included in the pass (M6¼ 6.43
vs. M12¼ 10.18; F(1, 351)¼ 319.07, p< .0001).
WTP. As shown in figure 2, participants’ WTP (in
Singapore dollars) for the one-day pass was scope-
insensitive under only one condition: when they had an ex-
periential motive and a near-future perspective
(M6¼ $67.30 vs. M12¼ $65.00; F< 1). They were sensi-
tive to the scope of the target in the remaining three combi-
nations of motive and temporal proximity: (a)
instrumental-motive/near-future (M6¼ $62.28 vs.
M12¼ $70.00; F(1, 351)¼ 2.67, p¼ .10, g2p¼ .008); (b)
experiential-motive/distant-future (M6¼ $66.00 vs.
M12¼ $75.53; F(1, 351)¼ 4.14, p¼ .043, g2p¼ .012); and
(c) instrumental-motive/distant-future (M6¼ $61.96 vs.
M12¼ $73.95; F(1, 351)¼ 7.07, p¼ .008, g2p¼ .020).
As in experiment 1, we tested our main predictions
through a series of interaction contrasts.3 In one pair of
contrasts, we tested whether the simple effect of scope was
significant and comparable in (a) the instrumental-motive/
near-future condition, (b) the experiential-motive/distant-
future condition, and (c) the instrumental-motive/distant-
future condition. These contrasts confirmed that across
these three conditions, the simple effect of scope was sig-
nificant (F(1, 351)¼ 13.24, p< .001, g2p¼ .036) and com-
parable (F(2, 351)< 1). In a third, more critical interaction
contrast, we pooled the simple effects of scope in these
three conditions and compared it to the simple effect of
scope in the experiential-motive/near-future condition. The
contrast (F(1, 351)¼ 5.40, p¼ .021, g2p¼ .015) confirmed
that there was stronger scope insensitivity in the
experiential-motive/near-future condition than in the other
conditions. These results parallel those of experiment 1 and
are consistent with the notion that (1) temporal proximity
moderates the scope-insensitivity phenomenon, and (2) does
so only under conditions that are conducive to a reliance on
affect in judgment. Under conditions that are not conducive
to this reliance, the scope-insensitivity phenomenon tends to
dissipate altogether, regardless of temporal proximity.
Discussion
The results replicate experiment 1’s main finding that
scope insensitivity is more likely when the target or out-
come is temporally proximate than when it is temporally
more distant. In addition, the results provide evidence that
the moderating effect of temporal proximity on scope sen-
sitivity is at least partially due to a differential reliance on
affect, depending on whether the target or outcome appears
temporally close or distant. When participants had instru-
mental motives and were therefore less likely to rely on af-
fect altogether, there was no scope insensitivity regardless
of temporal proximity (participants were sensitive to the
scope of the target even in the near-future condition). The
results thus replicate the results of experiment 1 with a dif-
ferent manipulation of likely reliance on affect.
The fact that two different operationalizations of likely re-
liance on affect—the affective richness of the stimuli and
the consumption motives of the decision maker—produced
similar results strongly supports the notion that temporal
proximity moderates the scope-insensitivity phenomenon
because affect is more likely to be engaged when the target
or outcome is temporally proximate than when it is tempo-
rally more distant. Therefore, for temporal proximity to mat-
ter in moderating the scope-insensitivity phenomenon, the
decision task should be conducive to a reliance on affect.
An interesting question, raised by a reviewer, is whether
encouraging a reliance on affect by promoting an experien-
tial motive would offset the tendency not to rely on affect
under conditions of high temporal distance. In other words,
are conditions of high motivational relevance of affect,
such as having experiential motives, sufficient to foster a
reliance on affect and therefore trigger scope insensitivity
regardless of temporal proximity? In our studies the find-
ings suggest that the answer is no. These findings are con-
sistent with other studies showing that when multiple
drivers of reliance on affect in judgment are manipulated
independently, all facilitating conditions have to be met for
affect to influence judgments (Pham 1998; Siemer and
Reisenzein 1998; White and McFarland 2009). In other
words, known drivers of the reliance on affect in judgment
typically appear to operate as necessary rather than suffi-
cient conditions, as was observed in these first two studies.
3 The three-way interaction (F(1, 351) ¼ .66, p ¼ .42) would have re-
quired a total sample size of more than 3,500 participants, or 440 per
condition, to achieve a statistical power of .70.
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EXPERIMENTS 3A AND 3B: SCOPE
INSENSITIVITY IN THE RECENT PAST
VERSUS THE DISTANT PAST
The first two experiments show that conditional on a po-
tential engagement of affective processes, scope insensitiv-
ity is stronger under a near future than under a more distant
future. The purpose of experiments 3A and 3B was to
show that temporal proximity exerts a similar moderating
effect on scope insensitivity when comparing a recent past
with a distant past. Although decisions are naturally
forward-looking, targets or objects associated with the past
can prompt memories of the past (Zauberman, Ratner, and
Kim 2009). Memories of the recent versus distant past ap-
pear to be stored in different parts of the brain (Okuda et al.
2003; Schacter 2008) and involve different ways of thinking
(Gilovich and Medvec 1994; Robinson and Swanson 1993).
Based on the finding that the affective system is more en-
gaged in relation to a recent past than in relation to a more
distant past (Chang and Pham 2013), one would predict that
scope insensitivity should be more likely when participants
are prompted to think of a recent past than when they are
prompted to think of a more distant past.
In experiments 3A and 3B, participants whose retrospec-
tive temporal proximity was manipulated were asked about
their WTP for a small or larger bundle of products. In ex-
periment 3A, we varied temporal proximity by associating
the targets with a recent past or a more distant past; in ex-
periment 3B, we varied it by priming memories of a recent
or more distant past event. In both experiments, we pre-
dicted that participants would be more scope-insensitive to
the number of products in the bundle in the recent-past
condition than in the distant-past condition.
Experiment 3A Method
A total of 150 students at a large university in Hong
Kong (57% women; average age¼ 20) were randomly
assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (scope: small vs.
large) 2 (temporal proximity: recent past vs. distant
past) between-subjects design. Participants were asked to
review the descriptions of one or three video games. In
the large-scope condition, participants were shown the
games Pong, Combat, and Duck Hunt, whereas in the
small-scope condition, participants were shown only one
of these games, selected at random. As in Chang and
Pham (2013, study 3), we manipulated temporal proxim-
ity by varying the description of each game and its ac-
companying screenshot. In the recent-past condition,
participants were told that the games had been created re-
cently, and were shown screenshots of contemporary ver-
sions of the games. In the distant-past condition,
participants were told that the games had been created in
the early 1980s, and were shown screenshots of original
versions of the games.
Participants were asked to indicate on a $0 to $30
scale (presented in $5 increments in Hong Kong dollars)
how much they would be willing to pay for the game(s),
taking into account the video game standards of the
time. They were then asked to guess the purpose of the
experiment. As a manipulation check for temporal prox-
imity, participants rated whether they thought of the
FIGURE 2
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game as being temporally close or distant on three
seven-point items (e.g., “very recent past/very distant
past”; a¼ .80). They also reported their task involve-
ment on two seven-point items (e.g., “I read through the
video game description very carefully”; r¼ .48). Finally,
they reported basic background information such as gen-
der and age.
Experiment 3A Results
Although none of the participants correctly guessed the
purpose of the study, data from four participants were re-
moved from the analyses (one participant for suspecting
that the study was about people’s feelings toward the
games and another three participants for skipping instruc-
tions), leaving 146 usable responses. Analysis of partici-
pants’ perception of temporal proximity revealed only a
main effect of temporal proximity (F(1, 142)¼ 8.96,
p< .01): the games were perceived to be closer in the
recent-past condition (M¼ 4.21) than in the distant-past
condition (M¼ 4.80). There were no differences in
reported task involvement across conditions (ps> .20).
Not surprisingly, participants’ WTP exhibited a main ef-
fect of scope (F(1, 142)¼ 10.65, p¼ .001, g2p¼ .070) such
that WTP was higher in the large-scope condition (M
¼ $9.79) than in the small-scope condition (M ¼ $6.08).
There was also a main effect of temporal proximity (F(1,
142)¼ 6.86, p¼ .01, g2p¼ .046), with participants willing
to pay more for the games in the distant-past condition
(M¼ $9.38) than in the recent-past condition (M¼ $6.44).
This could be due to the fact that participants were encour-
aged to use video game standards of the time and may
have been more lenient toward the older games. More im-
portantly, a scope temporal proximity interaction (F(1,
142)¼ 4.60, p¼ .034, g2p¼ .031) showed that participants’
WTP (in Hong Kong dollars) was more sensitive to scope
in the distant-past condition (Msmall ¼ $6.35 vs. Mlarge
¼ $12.50; F(1, 142)¼ 14.62, p< .001, g2p¼ .093) than in
the recent-past condition (Msmall ¼ $7.08 vs. Mlarge
¼ $5.81; F< 1). This is consistent with our prediction that
even temporal proximity of the past moderates the scope-
insensitivity phenomenon, and does it in a way similar to
how it moderates the reliance on affect in judgment
(Chang and Pham 2013).
Experiment 3B Method
The study was conducted in a field setting over a six-
week period. A total of 121 attendees of various graduation
ceremonies in New York City (students and their families
and friends; 51% women; age range 17–75) were recruited
as they exited the ceremonies, and were randomly assigned
to one of four conditions of a 2 (scope: small vs. large ) 2
(temporal proximity: recent past vs. distant past) between-
subjects design. The study employed a subtler priming
manipulation of temporal proximity and was administered
as two ostensibly unrelated studies. In the “first study,”
which was designed to prime different temporal mindsets,
participants were asked to recall and write about a gradua-
tion ceremony that they had attended. In the recent-past
condition, the ceremony was one that they had attended
“this week,” with all but one participant describing the cer-
emony that they had just attended. In the distant-past con-
dition, the ceremony to be described was one that they had
attended “in the past,” with all participants describing cere-
monies that they had attended at least one year earlier
(average¼ 6.6 years). After describing the graduation cere-
mony, participants indicated when the particular gradua-
tion had occurred.
In the “second study,” participants were asked to imag-
ine that a friend had to leave the country for family rea-
sons. This friend, who was a Beatles fan, owned a number
of Beatles CDs and wanted to sell them as a set. The set
consisted of either five or 10 Beatles CDs, which served as
a manipulation of scope. Participants were asked to indi-
cate their maximum WTP (in US dollars) for the CD set,
and to report their gender and age. Select participants were
probed about their perception of the studies’ purpose.
Experiment 3B Results
Seven participants were removed from the analyses—
five for failing to complete the key dependent measures,
one for taking a long break between the two parts of the
study, and one for reporting an extreme WTP of over
$1,000 reportedly to help his friend—leaving 114 usable
observations.
A main effect of scope indicated that participants’ WTP
was marginally higher for the larger CD set (M ¼ $46.79)
than for the smaller set (M ¼ $30.32; F(1, 110)¼ 3.10,
p¼ .081, g2p¼ .027). Central to our predictions, there was
a scope temporal proximity interaction (F(1,
110)¼ 4.19, p¼ .043, g2p¼ .037). Whereas in the recent-
past condition participants’ WTP was scope-insensitive
(Msmall ¼ $36.66 vs. Mlarge ¼ $34.00; F< 1), in the distant-
past condition, participants’ WTP was sensitive to scope
(Msmall ¼ $23.75 vs. Mlarge ¼ $59.14; F(1, 110)¼ 7.26,
p¼ .008, g2p¼ .062). This is again consistent with our pre-
diction that even temporal proximity of the past moderates
the scope-insensitivity phenomenon, and does it in the
same way it moderates the reliance on affect in judgment.
Discussion
This pair of experiments extends the previous experi-
ments’ findings by showing that the moderating effect of
temporal proximity on scope insensitivity operates not
only prospectively (when comparing a near vs. distant fu-
ture), but also retrospectively (when comparing a recent vs.
distant past). Specifically, in each experiment participants
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were significantly more scope-insensitive in their WTP if
they were encouraged to mentally represent the decision as
related to a more recent past than if they were encouraged
to represent the decision as related to a more distant past.
In experiment 3A—the results of which were replicated in
an earlier experiment conducted in 2009 using the same de-
sign and stimuli (see web appendix)—different temporal
representations of the decision were triggered by different
descriptions of the objects to be evaluated, whereas in ex-
periment 3B different temporal representations were in-
duced through the priming of unrelated memories. The
latter study shows that what is critical in determining the
engagement of affect (and resulting scope insensitivity) is
not the physical attributes of the target object per se (e.g.,
old vs. recent versions of video games), but rather the de-
gree of psychological distance that is evoked by the per-
son’s mental representation of the decision, which is akin
to a mindset. For instance, it is not because a target object
is described as “old” (e.g., an old gentleman) that it would
necessarily evoke spontaneous representations of a remote
past and high temporal distance. Given that experiments
3A and 3B produced very similar results with such differ-
ent operationalizations of temporal proximity, different
manipulations of scope, and different valuation tasks pro-
vides compelling evidence in support of the notion of a
greater engagement of the overall affective system in judg-
ments that involve targets that are temporally proximate,
even retrospectively.
EXPERIMENTS 4A AND 4B: SCOPE
INSENSITIVITY AND SOCIAL AND
SPATIAL PROXIMITY
The purpose of experiments 4A and 4B was to extend
our findings by investigating the effects of other dimen-
sions of psychological proximity on scope insensitivity. If
what determines the engagement of the affective system re-
ally is a proximity to the immediate self, as opposed to
temporal proximity per se, one would expect the scope-
insensitivity phenomenon to be similarly contingent on so-
cial and spatial proximity as was observed with temporal
proximity in the previous studies.
Experiments 4A and 4B followed a similar procedure.
Participants were first asked to think about a person who
was either (a) physically or socially close to them or (b)
physically or socially distant from them. They were then
asked to assess their WTP for a small or larger quantity of
goods for the person’s benefit. In both experiments, we
predicted that participants’ WTP would exhibit scope in-
sensitivity under conditions of high social or physical prox-
imity but not under conditions of higher social or physical
distance. Such a finding would indicate that the differential
engagement of the affective system is not just a function of
temporal proximity, but also a function of proximity to the
immediate self.
Experiment 4A Method
It is well known that people who live closer to one an-
other also tend to be socially closer (Festinger, Schachter,
and Back 1950). In this experiment, we capitalize on this
correlation to manipulate psychological proximity, inde-
pendently of temporal proximity, through perceptions of
physical proximity.
A total of 160 MTurk participants (47% women; average
age¼ 31) were randomly assigned to one of four condi-
tions of a 2 (scope: small vs. large) 2 (proximity: close
vs. distant) between-subjects design. Participants were
asked to think about a friend who either “lives in the same
town as [they] do” (close-proximity condition) or “lives in
a town at least 500 miles away” (distant-proximity condi-
tion; Baskin et al. 2014). As a check of the proximity ma-
nipulation, they then reported (a) how often they spoke to
their friend on a 1 (very rarely) to 7 (very frequently) scale,
and (b) the approximate number of times they meet this
friend every year. Participants also reported their friend’s
gender.
Next, participants were asked to imagine that this partic-
ular friend was moving away. This friend has a small DVD
collection of a popular TV show and wants to sell it as a
box set containing either one season (six DVDs) or four
seasons (24 DVDs) of the show, which served as the scope
manipulation. As the main dependent measure, participants
were asked to assess their maximum WTP (in US dollars)
for the DVD set (assuming no shipping cost). Next, they
were asked to guess the purpose of the experiment and to
report their task involvement on four seven-point items
(e.g., “I read through the hypothetical scenario of my
friend moving away and selling his/her belongings very
carefully”; a¼ .71). As manipulation checks for scope,
they were asked to indicate the number of seasons and the
total number of DVDs included in the set. Finally, they
reported their gender and age.
Experiment 4A Results
While none of the participants correctly guessed the pur-
pose of the study, two participants were removed because
their response times indicated they did not read the materi-
als properly, leaving 158 usable observations. The scope
manipulation was successful, revealing only a main effect
of scope on the reported numbers of seasons and DVDs.
Participants in the small-scope condition reported an aver-
age of 1.86 seasons and 9.58 DVDs, and those in the large-
scope condition reported an average of 4.50 seasons (F(1,
154)¼ 44.63, p< .0001) and 16.73 DVDs (F(1,
154)¼ 9.88, p¼ .002). The proximity manipulation was
also successful. Participants indicated speaking to their
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friend more often in the close-proximity condition (M
¼ 5.61) than in the distant-proximity condition (M ¼ 4.53;
F(1, 154)¼ 15.97, p< .0001), and estimated seeing their
friend more often in the close-proximity condition (M
¼ 108.35) than in the distant-proximity condition (M
¼ 19.59; F(1, 154)¼ 34.57, p< .0001). There were no dif-
ferences in reported task involvement (Fs< 1).
A 2 2 ANOVA of participants’ WTP (in US dollars)
showed a higher WTP in the large-scope condition
(M¼ $39.00) than in the small-scope condition (M
¼ $22.48; F(1, 154)¼ 11.59, p< .001, g2p¼ .070). More
importantly, this effect was qualified by a significant sco-
pe proximity interaction (F(1, 154)¼ 4.04, p< .05,
g2p¼ .026). Whereas participants in the close-proximity
condition tended to be scope-insensitive in their WTP
(Msmall ¼ $24.80 vs. Mlarge ¼ $31.33; F< 1), those in the
distant-proximity condition were significantly sensitive to
the scope of the DVD set (Msmall ¼ $19.92 vs. Mlarge
¼ $45.27; F(1, 154)¼ 15.02, p< .001, g2p¼ .089). The
findings support the notion that scope insensitivity is more
likely to be observed not just under conditions of temporal
proximity (as shown in experiments 1–3B), but more gen-
erally under conditions of increased proximity to the im-
mediate self.
Experiment 4B Method
Whereas experiment 4A manipulated perceived proxim-
ity to the immediate self through the physical proximity of
friends, experiment 4B manipulated perceived self-
proximity through the social proximity of professional
colleagues. The study was conducted among MTurk partic-
ipants who were prescreened to ensure that they were
employed full-time and had worked at their current work-
place for at least three months. This prescreening was
designed to ensure that the decision scenario would be rele-
vant to participants. A total of 167 MTurk participants
(43% women; age range: 19–63) who qualified were ran-
domly assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (scope:
small vs. large) 2 (proximity: close vs. distant) between-
subjects design.
Under the guise of an “Employee Relationship Study,”
participants were asked to think about a specific colleague
at their workplace. In the close-colleague condition, they
were asked to think about a colleague whom they see as a
close friend and know fairly well; in the distant-colleague
condition, they were asked to think about a colleague
whom they see as just an acquaintance and know only
slightly. To reinforce the proximity manipulation, all par-
ticipants were asked to indicate the person’s first name and
describe how they initially met this person. Participants
then reported (a) the length of time they have known this
colleague (1¼ for a long time; 7¼ just met; reverse-
coded), (b) how often they talk to each other (1¼ very
rarely; 7¼ very frequently), and (c) how close or distant
they feel toward this colleague on two seven-point scales
(e.g., “not at all close/extremely close”; r¼ .92).
Participants also reported this colleague’s gender.
Next, participants were asked to imagine that the col-
league they had identified is leaving the company. As a
farewell present to the colleague, participants were asked
to consider a box of chocolate truffles containing either
four or six pieces, which was the scope manipulation. As
the main dependent measure, participants were asked to
state their WTP (in US dollars) for the box of chocolate
truffles. They were then asked to guess the purpose of the
experiment and to report their mood on five seven-point
items (e.g., “bad/good,” “unpleasant/ pleasant”; a¼ .96)
and task involvement on three seven-point items (e.g., “I
read through the hypothetical scenario of my coworker
leaving the company and giving this person a farewell pre-
sent very carefully”; a¼ .71). As a check for the scope ma-
nipulation, they indicated the number of chocolate truffles
in the scenario. Finally, they reported basic information
such as gender and age, and how likely they would be to
give any colleague who is moving away a farewell present
(1¼ not at all likely; 7¼ very likely).
Experiment 4B Results
None of the participants correctly guessed the purpose
of the study. However, two participants were removed
from the analyses because they indicated that they would
not give anyone who is moving away a farewell present,
thus leaving 165 usable observations. Participants’ esti-
mate of the number of chocolates revealed only a main
effect of scope, with an average of 4.11 pieces in the
small-scope condition and an average of 6.27 pieces in the
large-scope condition (F(1, 161)¼ 156.54, p< .0001).
Analyses of the perceived employee proximity revealed
only a main effect of proximity. Compared to those in the
distant-proximity condition, participants in the close-
proximity condition reported (a) feeling closer to this col-
league (Mclose¼ 4.91, Mdistant¼ 2.70; F(1, 161)¼ 103.52,
p< .0001), (b) having known this colleague for a longer
period of time (Mclose¼ 4.98, Mdistant¼ 4.21; F(1,
161)¼ 10.49, p< .002), and (c) having spoken to this col-
league more often outside of work (Mclose¼ 4.84,
Mdistant¼ 3.21; F(1, 161)¼ 43.72, p< .0001). These results
confirm the effectiveness of the employee-proximity ma-
nipulation. There were no differences in reported task in-
volvement (ps> .27) or participants’ mood (Fs< 1) across
conditions.
A 2 2 ANOVA of participants’ WTP (in US dollars)
revealed a main effect of scope showing that participants
were willing to pay more in the large-scope condition (M
¼ $12.35) than in the small-scope condition (M ¼ $9.88;
F(1, 161)¼ 4.61, p¼ .033, g2p¼ .028). A main effect of
proximity indicated that participants were willing to pay
more for a close colleague (M¼ $12.28) than for a distant
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colleague (M¼ $9.86; F(1, 161)¼ 3.94, p< .05,
g2p¼ .024), which is not surprising. More central to our
predictions, there was again a scope proximity interac-
tion (F(1, 161)¼ 4.56, p¼ .034, g2p¼ .028). As predicted,
participants in the close-proximity condition exhibited
scope insensitivity (Msmall ¼ $12.27 vs. Mlarge ¼ $12.28;
F< 1), whereas those in the distant condition exhibited sig-
nificant sensitivity to scope (Msmall ¼ $7.86 vs. Mlarge
¼ $12.44; F(1, 161)¼ 8.88, p¼ .003, g2p¼ .052).
Discussion
The results of this pair of experiments help refine the no-
tion of proximity both as a moderator of the scope-
insensitivity phenomenon and as a determinant of the en-
gagement of the overall affective system in judgments.
Specifically, the results converge in showing that scope in-
sensitivity is more likely when the target is psychologically
proximate than when it is psychologically more distant.
Both physical proximity, holding relationship type constant
(nearby vs. far-away friend in experiment 4A), and social
proximity, holding physical distance constant (close vs.
distant company colleague in experiment 4B), have the
same effect on scope insensitivity as temporal proximity
does.4 This is consistent with the idea that the boundaries
of engagement of the affective system are defined not just
by a proximity to the present, as previously suggested by
Chang and Pham (2013), but more generally by a proxim-
ity to the immediate self.
EXPERIMENT 5: SCOPE
(IN)SENSITIVITY, CONSUMPTION
MOTIVE, AND CLOSE VERSUS DISTANT
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP
This final experiment was designed to provide further
evidence that the moderating effect of social proximity on
scope insensitivity, observed in experiments 4A and 4B, is
due to a differential reliance on affect, depending on
whether the decision involves close versus distant others.
In addition to manipulating scope and social proximity, we
manipulated participants’ likelihood of reliance on affect
through consumption motives, as in experiment 2. Half of
the participants were encouraged to make their valuation
judgments under an experiential motive; the remaining half
was encouraged to make their valuation judgments under
an instrumental motive. We predicted that participants who
assumed an experiential motive would be more likely to
exhibit scope-insensitive valuations under socially proxi-
mate conditions but not under socially distant conditions.
In contrast, participants who assumed an instrumental mo-
tive would exhibit scope-sensitive valuations regardless of
conditions of social proximity.
Method
Overview. A total of 340 undergraduate students at
Singapore Management University (56% women; average
age¼ 21) were randomly assigned to one of eight condi-
tions of a 2 (consumption motive: experiential vs.
instrumental) 2 (scope: 1 movie vs. 3 movies) 2 (social
proximity: close friend vs. distant friend) between-subjects
design.
Procedure and Measures. Under the pretense of a
study about college students’ friendship with their peers,
participants were asked to think about a specific student
who was in the same class or extracurricular activity as the
participant. In the close-friend condition, they were asked
to think about a peer who is “a close friend. . .who you
know fairly well”; in the distant-friend condition, they
were asked to think about a peer who is “just an acquain-
tance. . .who you know just slightly.” To reinforce this ma-
nipulation of social proximity, participants were asked to
indicate the first and last name of this person, his or her
gender, and how they met. The same manipulation checks
for social proximity as those in experiment 4B were col-
lected (r¼ .94).
Participants then received the consumption-motive ma-
nipulation (Chang and Pham 2013, study 5; Pham 1998).
In the experiential-motive condition, they were told that
they “deserve some leisure time over the weekend,”
whereas in the instrumental-motive condition, they were
told about an extra course-credit opportunity that involved
writing a short paper about an independent film. All partic-
ipants were told to imagine that the specific peer they had
identified earlier invited them to attend an independent
film festival. A festival pass was described that included
either one movie or three movies, depending on the scope
condition. We described the movies using the materials of
an actual film festival that was about to take place in
Singapore.
Participants were asked to indicate their WTP for the
movie pass (in Singapore dollars), which was the main de-
pendent measure. They were then asked to guess the pur-
pose of the study and report their task involvement on four
seven-point items (e.g., “I read through the hypothetical
scenario of going to a film festival very carefully”;
a¼ .82). As a check for scope, they were asked to indicate
4 With respect to experiment 4A, one could argue that the lack of
scope sensitivity in the close-friend condition may have been due to
norms of communal relationship (e.g., “close friends should always
help each other”) that deactivated participants’ calculative mindsets.
However, one additional result in that study seems to speak against a
strict communal-norm interpretation. If participants’ WTPs were
mostly driven by the activation of communal norms in the close-friend
condition, one would expect the mean WTP to be higher in the com-
munal (“you should help your close friends”) condition than in the
less-communal (“distant friends matter less”) condition. There was no
such main effect of closeness in that study.
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the number of movies included in the pass. Finally, they
reported basic background information (e.g., gender, age).
Results
Preliminary Analyses. None of the participants cor-
rectly guessed the purpose of the study. Analyses were
based on all 340 observations. A 2 2 2 ANOVA of per-
ceived social closeness yielded only a main effect of social
proximity (F(1, 332)¼ 224.91, p< .0001). As expected,
participants felt much closer to their peer in the close-
friend condition (M¼ 5.33) than in the distant-friend con-
dition (M¼ 2.93). Participants in the close-friend condition
also stated that they have known their peer for a longer pe-
riod of time (Mclose¼ 4.72, Mdistant¼ 3.38; F(1,
332)¼ 60.88, p< .0001) and spoke to their peer more often
(Mclose¼ 5.27, Mdistant¼ 2.80; F(1, 332)¼ 182.42,
p< .0001). Participants also appreciated the difference in
scope of the target: they estimated that the movie pass in-
cluded 1.66 movies in the one-movie condition and 3.02
movies in the three-movies condition (F(1, 332)¼ 130.34,
p< .0001). There was an unexpected but marginally signif-
icant main effect of consumption motive on scope
(Mexperiential¼ 2.17, Minstrumental¼ 2.54; F(1, 332)¼ 3.26,
p> .07). Other effects did not reach significance (ps> .23).
There was no difference in task involvement across condi-
tions (ps> .14).
WTP. As shown in figure 3, participants’ WTP (in
Singapore dollars) for the movie pass was scope-
insensitive in only one of the four combinations of motive
and social proximity: (a) when the decision involved a
close friend and they had an experiential motive
(M1¼ $11.74 vs. M3¼ $11.76; F< 1). In contrast, partici-
pants appeared to be significantly sensitive to the scope of
the target object in the remaining three conditions: (b) a
close friend and an instrumental motive (M1¼ $9.51 vs.
M3¼ $13.74; F(1, 332)¼ 13.90, p< .001, g2p¼ .040); (c) a
distant friend and an experiential motive (M1¼ $9.46 vs.
M3¼ $12.52; F(1, 332)¼ 8.02, p¼ .005, g2p¼ .024); and
(d) a distant friend and an instrumental motive (M1¼ $8.38
vs. M3¼ $12.38; F(1, 332)¼ 12.27, p< .001, g2p¼ .036).
This pattern of results closely parallels the results of
experiments 1 and 2 and is consistent with the notion that
social proximity moderates the scope-insensitivity phe-
nomenon under conditions that are conducive to reliance
on affect in judgment. The moderating effect of social
proximity dissipates when reliance on affect is unlikely.
As in experiments 1 and 2, we tested our main predic-
tions through a series of interaction contrasts.5 In the
first two contrasts, we tested whether the simple effect
of scope was significant and comparable in (b) the
instrumental-motive/close-friend condition, (c) the
experiential-motive/distant-friend condition, and (d) the
instrumental-motive/distant-friend condition. The simple
effect of scope was significant (F(1, 332)¼ 33.90,
p< .0001, g2p¼ .093) and comparable (F(2, 332)¼ 1.18,
p> .27) across the three conditions. In the third interaction
contrast, we pooled the simple effects of scope in these
three conditions and compared it to the simple effect of
scope in (a) the experiential-motive/close-friend condition.
The interaction contrast was significant (F(1, 332)¼ 8.08,
p< .005, g2p¼ .024), supporting our prediction of a more
pronounced scope insensitivity in the experiential-motive/
close-friend condition compared to the other conditions.
Discussion
The results replicate the findings of experiments 4A and
4B that the scope-insensitivity phenomenon is more likely
to be observed under conditions of high social proximity to
the immediate self. The results also parallel experiments 1
and 2’s findings in showing that the moderating effect of
social proximity on scope insensitivity can be at least par-
tially attributed to a differential reliance on affect under
high versus low proximity. When participants had experi-
ential motives and were therefore expected to rely on their
feelings, their WTP was scope-insensitive when the con-
sumption episode involved a peer who was socially close,
but not when it involved a peer who was socially distant.
In contrast, when participants had instrumental motives
and were therefore unlikely to rely on their feelings, their
WTP exhibited sensitivity to scope irrespective of social
proximity.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The Boundaries of Scope Insensitivity
There has been considerable debate about the robust-
ness, and even authenticity, of the scope-insensitivity phe-
nomenon (Carson 1997; Carson, Flores, and Meade 2001;
Hanley, Schl€apfer, and Spurgeon 2003) and its possible un-
derlying explanation (Frederick and Fischhoff 1998). Our
research moves this debate forward by clarifying the
boundaries of this phenomenon and reaffirming its ground-
ing in affective processes.
We concur with Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) and
Kahneman and colleagues (1999) that scope insensitivity is
substantially driven by affective processes of evaluation.
Indeed, our studies provide consistent evidence of greater
scope insensitivity when affective engagement is more
likely, whether because of affect-rich stimuli (experiment
1) or because of experiential decision motives (experi-
ments 2 and 5). More importantly, this research helps clar-
ify the architecture of the affective system and thereby the
boundaries of the scope-insensitivity phenomenon.
Building on recent work suggesting that the affective
5 The three-way interaction (F(1, 332) ¼ 2.09, p ¼ .15) would have
required a total sample size of more than 1,000 participants to achieve
a statistical power of .70.
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system of judgment and decision making is inherently a
system of the present (Chang and Pham 2013), we advance
the notion that affect is more broadly a system of the imme-
diate self. That is, affect is not only anchored on the “now”
as compared to a more distant future or past, as Chang and
Pham (2013) previously showed, it is also anchored on the
“me” rather than more distant others, and on the “here”
rather than more distant settings. As a result, scope insensi-
tivity is more likely to occur in valuation judgments with
outcomes and targets that are psychologically close than in
valuation judgments with outcomes and targets that are
psychologically more distant. As illustrated in table 1, dis-
cussed earlier in the article, considerable variability in
whether or not scope insensitivity was observed in past
studies seems to be attributable to the degree of psycholog-
ical proximity or distance conveyed by each study’s deci-
sion scenario. Our studies provide more direct tests of our
theoretical proposition.
Consistent with our general proposition, results from
seven experiments (and two replications) supported four
important conclusions. First, valuation judgments are more
scope-insensitive if the temporal horizon is proximate than
if the temporal horizon is more distant (experiments 1, 2,
3A, and 3B). Second, the moderating effect of temporal
proximity on scope insensitivity can be observed both pro-
spectively, when comparing a near future with a more dis-
tant future (as in experiments 1 and 2), and retrospectively,
when comparing a recent past with a more distant past (as
in experiments 3A and 3B). Third, the moderating effects
of psychological proximity extend beyond temporal prox-
imity. Specifically, valuations are more scope-insensitive
in decisions involving a spatially close other than in deci-
sions involving a spatially distant other (experiment 4A),
and in decisions involving a socially close other than in
decisions involving a socially distant other (experiments
4B and 5). Finally, temporal or social proximity moderates
scope insensitivity only when a reliance on affect is likely;
when a reliance on affect is unlikely, valuations appear to
regain a sensitivity to scope regardless of psychological
proximity (experiments 1, 2, and 5). Together these find-
ings support the ideas that (a) the scope-insensitivity phe-
nomenon is indeed driven in large part by the reliance on
affect in judgment; (b) as a result, the phenomenon is more
likely under conditions of psychological proximity; and (c)
the affective system of judgment is a system anchored on
the immediate self.
As a rough quantitative assessment of the overall predic-
tive power of our theorizing in accounting for the scope
insensitivity phenomenon, we conducted an internal meta-
analysis of the size of the scope effect on participants’
monetary valuations (WTD or WTP) across conditions in
our experiments that were designed to promote affective
engagement independent of self-proximity (i.e., conditions
that should lead to scope insensitivity according to prior re-
search). As shown in figure 4, the size of this effect, mea-
sured as Cohen’s d, varied considerably depending on
whether the conditions entailed high or low self-proximity.
When self-proximity was high, the average size of the
scope effect was .04 (95% CI: –.12–.20), consistent with
the notion of scope insensitivity. However, when self-
proximity was low (psychological distance was high), the
FIGURE 3
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average size of this effect was .58 (95% CI: .42–.75), indi-
cating substantial sensitivity to scope.
Contributions to the Judgment and
Decision-Making Literature
These results contribute to the judgment and decision-
making literature in multiple ways. With respect to the
literature on scope insensitivity, our research makes five
important contributions. First, our findings reaffirm the
material reality of the scope-insensitivity phenomenon by
providing another seven independent empirical demonstra-
tions of the phenomenon (plus two replications). Second,
our findings give additional credence to the proposition
that the scope-insensitivity phenomenon is largely driven
by affective processes (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004;
Kahneman et al. 1999). Third, and more importantly, our
research identifies a previously unrecognized moderator of
the scope-insensitivity phenomenon: psychological prox-
imity or distance. This moderator has substantial explana-
tory power, both as an a posteriori interpretation of
previous results (see table 1) and as an a priori predictor in
our seven new studies (see figure 4). If we combine the
prior studies’ results (summarized in table 1) with our own
results (summarized in figure 4), there is an across-studies
correlation of /.¼ 74 between the level of self-proximity
inherent to the study and whether the valuation judgments
were found to be scope-sensitive or -insensitive. Fourth,
whereas scope insensitivity has been mostly studied in the
domain of contingent valuations, our studies provide
FIGURE 4
INTERNAL META-ANALYSIS OF EFFECT OF SCOPE UNDER CONDITIONS FAVORING RELIANCE ON AFFECT
(A) HIGH SELF-PROXIMITY
(B) LOW SELF-PROXIMITY
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further evidence that this phenomenon also has implica-
tions for consumers’ WTP for more traditional goods and
services that have market prices. Finally, to the extent that
scope insensitivity is logically irrational and generally un-
desirable substantively (e.g., when one is soliciting dona-
tions for environmental causes, when one is estimating
WTP for various goods), our findings suggest a simple and
practical way to reduce scope insensitivity: increase the
psychological distance of the target or outcome in
question.
In addition to contributing to the literature on scope in-
sensitivity, our research adds to the broader judgment and
decision-making literature by refining our understanding of
the affective system of judgment. Our findings suggest that
the differential engagement of the affective system across
time horizons is not limited to the intensity of affective
experiences (Loewenstein 1996; Metcalfe and Mischel
1999), nor to people’s reliance on affective experience in
judgment (Chang and Pham 2013). Instead, it likely
extends to any judgment biases in which affect plays a cen-
tral role. In the present studies, this principle was demon-
strated with the scope-insensitivity phenomenon. However,
other judgmental biases typically attributed to affect—such
as belief distortion, polarization, and reference dependence
(see Pham 2007 for a review)—can similarly be expected
to be moderated by the notion of psychological proximity.
Moreover, our findings suggest that affect is not only a
decision-making system of the present, it is more generally
a decision-making system of the immediate self. Any form
of distance from the self in the here and now—whether in
time, social relation, or physical space—tends to disengage
the overall affective system of judgment and decision
making.
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
One obvious limitation of this research is that while the
overall pattern of results is generally consistent with our
theoretical propositions, our studies do not provide clear
process evidence of the proposed explanation. This is a
limitation that is characteristic of most behavioral decision
research, and needs to be acknowledged. Another limita-
tion is that all our studies involved hypothetical decision
scenarios for which participants did not have an actual
monetary incentive to reveal their “true” valuations. It is
therefore possible that incentive-compatible studies might
yield different results. Addressing these limitations would
provide fruitful avenues for future research.
Another potential avenue would be to examine whether
affect may drive insensitivity to other cognitive character-
istics of the target option besides its scope, such as its price
or the payment vehicle used. For example, it is possible
that affect might be driving an insensitivity to monetary
differences, resulting in comparable WTP when affect is
evoked. Indirect evidence from studies examining purchase
situations wherein affect plays a central role, such as im-
pulsive purchases (Vohs and Faber 2007) and hedonic con-
sumptions (Wakefield and Inman 2003), supports the idea
that affect might lead to less price sensitivity. To the extent
that in our studies the dependent variable always involved
a monetary form of valuation (WTD or WTP), it is difficult
to ascertain whether our effects were driven by a genuine
insensitivity to the scope of the to-be-valuated objects (as
we hypothesized), or instead by an insensitivity to money
as an expression of one’s private valuation. However, three
sets of considerations seem to favor a standard scope-
insensitivity interpretation over a monetary-insensitivity
interpretation for our findings. First, while monetary insen-
sitivity could be a correlate of scope insensitivity, to the
best of our knowledge there is little direct empirical evi-
dence of price insensitivity in the contingent-valuation lit-
erature in which scope insensitivity is typically observed
(Carson 1997). Second, affect-based scope insensitivity
has been observed when the dependent variable is nonmon-
etary (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004, study 4). Finally, an
explanation based on affect-driven insensitivity to mone-
tary value would likely predict a main effect of affect rich-
ness. This was examined in our studies where affect
richness was manipulated independently of the target; in
none of these studies was there a significant main effect of
affect richness. To disentangle scope insensitivity and
monetary insensitivity, future research can orthogonally
vary the scope and the price attached to the target in
question.
In three of our experiments, we designed decision tasks
to be more or less conducive to a reliance on affect. We
considered two potential moderators of likely reliance on
affect in judgment: the affective richness of the target stim-
uli (experiment 1) and the consumption motive underlying
the decision (experiments 2 and 5). The first moderator
varies the accessibility of feelings toward the evaluation
target, whereas the second moderator varies the relevance
of feelings toward the target. We believe that both condi-
tions—the accessibility and relevance of feelings—are nec-
essary for psychological proximity to matter. However,
two related theoretical questions arise. First, in our studies,
is affect moderating the effect of proximity on scope insen-
sitivity, or is proximity moderating the effect of affect on
the phenomenon? Our studies indicate that both proximity
and affect are necessary for scope insensitivity to emerge.
However, our experiments do not tease these two plausible
causal paths apart. Second, must affect emanate from the
evaluative target for scope insensitivity to transpire, or
would the phenomenon still occur if affect is in fact inci-
dental to the target? This is an empirical question that
remains to be investigated. We suspect that, for the phe-
nomenon to emerge, affect needs to originate from the tar-
get itself (i.e., the target needs to be emotion-laden). This
is because, in line with Kahneman et al. (1999), we specu-
late that scope insensitivity arises from how affect from a
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concrete, prototypical mental image of the target is
experienced.
Our theoretical framework suggests additional predic-
tions beyond the ones tested in the present research.
Specifically, if the affective system of judgment is indeed a
system of the immediate self, theoretically any judgment
and decision-making phenomenon (besides scope insensi-
tivity) that is linked to this system should be more pro-
nounced when outcomes and targets are psychologically
close than when they are psychologically more distant. For
example, a well-known phenomenon that is usually attrib-
uted to the affective system is the so-called “ratio bias”
(Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994), whereby people given a
choice to draw from one of two bowls of jelly beans—a
larger bowl containing a greater number but lower propor-
tion of target-color beans (e.g., seven out of 100) and a
smaller bowl containing a smaller number but higher pro-
portion of target-color beans (e.g., one out of 10)—would
choose to draw from the larger bowl despite the lower sta-
tistical probability of obtaining a target-color bean.
According to Epstein and Pacini (1999), this phenomenon
reflects the operation of an experiential system of judgment
that relies on affect and feelings rather than logic and rules.
If the ratio bias is indeed driven by the affective system,
one would predict that this bias would be magnified under
increased psychological proximity and attenuated under in-
creased psychological distance. Similar predictions could
be made about other decision phenomena commonly attrib-
uted to affect, such as the tendency to reject positive but
unfair offers in the ultimatum game (Sanfey et al. 2003).
Testing such predictions would be productive avenues for
future research.
DATA COLLECTION INFORMATION
The first author conducted experiment 1 on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) panel in the summers of 2014
and 2016 (and its replication, which is reported in the web
appendix, in person at the behavioral lab at Columbia
University during winter of the 2006–2007 academic year).
The first author supervised the collection of data for
experiments 2 and 5 by research assistants at Singapore
Management University in the autumns of 2013 and 2015,
respectively. The first author supervised the collection of
data for experiment 3A by research assistants at HKUST in
the autumn of 2013 (and for its replication, in the spring of
2009, also at HKUST). For experiment 3B, the first author
conducted the in-person fieldwork at various graduation
ceremonies in New York City from mid-May 2007 to late
June 2007. The first author collected data for experiments
4A and 4B on MTurk panel in the summers of 2014 and
2015, respectively. Analyses were performed by the first
author, while the second author supervised the data
analyses and suggested data analysis methods for experi-
ments 1, 2, and 5.
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